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REMEDIES IN ADMIRALTY FOR OIL POLLUTION
STEPHEN E. RoADY*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the closing days of 1976 and the first week of 1977, seven
accidents occurred involving tankers transporting oil to United States
ports.' Two of these incidents resulted in spills in close proximity to
shore,2 and one, the grounding of the Argo Merchant off the south-
eastern coast of Nantucket, Massachusetts, produced a massive 7,600,000
gallon oil spill that may do significant damage to the fertile Georges
Fishing Bank.8
In the wake of such maritime disasters, owners of shoreline property
may seek to recover damages for tanker oil pollution. This article will
explore the admiralty remedies available to such owners residing in
states which lack the statutory protection afforded Floridians by the
Pollutant Spill Prevention and Control Act.
4
II. Ti PROBLEM
While recent events graphically illustrate the threat to shoreline
Associate, Duncan, Brown, Weinberg & Palmer, Washington, D.C. B.A., Davidson
College, 1971; J.D., Duke University, 1976.
1. In order of occurrence the accidents were:
Dec. 15-The . . . Argo Merchant ran aground 27 miles southeast of Nantucket
Island [Mass.] and broke up six days later, spilling 7.6 million gallons of oil into
the Atlantic.
Dec. 17-The . . . Sansinena exploded in Los Angeles Harbor, leaving nine dead,
and 50 injured.
Dec. 24-The . . . Oswego Peace spilled 2,000 gallons of oil in the Thames River
near Groton, Conn.
Dec. 27-The . . . Olympic Games ran aground in the Delaware River near
Philadelphia, spilling 133,000 gallons of oil and [affecting] the shorelines of three
states.
Dec. 29-The . . . Daphne ran aground in Guauanilla Bay, Puerto Rico, but
spilled no oil.
Jan. 4-The . . . Universe Leader ran aground in the Delaware River and was
refloated [one day later] with no spill reported.
Jan. 5-The . . . Austin spilled 2,100 gallons of oil into San Francisco Bay while
loading at Martinez, Calif.
123 CONG. REc. S421 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy quoting from
Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 1977).
2. 123 CONG. REc., supra note 1, with specific reference to the spills occurring on
Dec. 24 and Dec. 27.
3. 123 CONG. REc., supra note 1, with specific reference to the spill occurring on
Dec. 15.
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 376 (1975).
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property owners posed by oil tanker transportation, these events do
not begin to reveal the true dimensions of the problem. The United
States Coast Guard estimates that there were approximately 1,543
spills from tank ships and barges into the waters of the United States
in 1973, totalling 6,066,313 gallons of released oil.5 For the year 1975,
Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency files contain
reports of approximately 12,000 oil spills totaling nearly 22,000,000
gallons of released oil; "[t]wenty of these spills accounted for
[sixteen] million gallons of spillage." 6 In the seven years prior to De-
cember 1976, major spills had occurred off the coasts of Maine, 7 Cali-
fornia, New York,9 and Connecticut, 0 as well as Florida. 1'
Yet accidental spills account for only a small proportion of the
total amount of oil that annually enters the oceans. The National
Academy of Sciences asserts that while approximately 142,000,000
gallons of crude oil is spilled each year as a result of tanker accidents,
more than 710,000,000 gallons are discharged annually as a result of
"routine" deballasting and cleaning operations.12 Residents of the
Florida Keys felt the effects of just such a routine operation in July
1975 after the tanker Garbis flushed over 40,000 gallons of oil and
cleaning solution into the Florida Straits. When the resulting slick
washed ashore, over forty miles of coastline were affected, necessitating
a two-month cleanup operation which cost nearly $400,000.13
The effects of an oil spill can be both economically debilitating and
environmentally disastrous. The government of Bermuda reportedly
spends $100,000 a year sifting the sands of its public beaches for tar
balls, the result of frequent tanker flushing practices.. 4 And although
one study commissioned by the American Petroleum Institute con-
cluded that the life cycles of certain marine life remain unaffected by
5. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., METHODS AND PROCEDURES FOR IM-
PLEMENTING A UNIFORM LAW PROVIDING LIABILITY FOR CLEAN-UP COSTS AND DAMAGES
CAUSED BY OIL SPILLS FROM OCEAN RELATED SOURCES 12 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter
DEP'r OF JUSTICE REPORT].
6. 123 CONG. REC. S1579 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Stafford quoting
from Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1976).
7. See Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 382 F. Supp. 351 (S.D. Me. 1974).
8. See Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
9. See Comment, The Import-Export Clause and the Control of Oil Pollution:
Regulatory Fees Imposed Pursuant to the Police Power, 54 B.U. L. REv. 610, 610 n.1
(1974).
10. See Comment, Admiralty Remedies for Vessel Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters,
7 TiEx. INT'L L.J. 121 (1971) [hereinafter Admiralty Remedies].
11. Id. at 121 n.3.
12. 123 CONG. REc. E193 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Lent quoting
from NEWSDAY, Jan. 10, 1977).
15. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
14. 123 CONG. REc., supra note 6, at S1580.
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the celebrated Santa Barbara Channel oil platform blowout of 1969,1
a report by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution on the effects
of a spill that same year at the west end of Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts,
showed that within one week the marine population of a nearby harbor
had fallen from 200,000 to 2 animals per square meter.1" A report
prepared by the United States Department of Justice for the Senate
Committee on Commerce states:
[T]he organisms potentially affected by an oil spill are closely inter-
related, especially in the estuaries, and ... an impact on any species
or groups within this system will affect the entire system. The result-
ing impact on the system may disrupt it for several years or in the
case of loss of physical habitat may be permanent."
III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
The federal government has not provided a complete remedy for
private beach property owners who suffer damage from oil spills. The
Deepwater Port Act of 197411 and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act", hold the owners and operators of vessels which spill oil liable
for any resulting damage. However, the provisions of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Act apply to oil which has passed through the Trans-Alaska
pipeline,20 and the Deepwater Port Act only covers vessels which have
received oil at a "deepwater port." 21
Two federal statutes currently authorize the United States govern-
ment to institute actions against oil polluters. Section 13 of the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 189922 has been uniformly inter-
preted to allow the government to collect fines28 for oil pollution,2 4
while Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 197225 expressly states that the owner or operator of any
vessel responsible for oil pollution shall be liable to the United States
for civil penalties and costs of removal.
26
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. DEP'T oF JuSTmcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
18. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524; 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. V 1975).
19. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (Supp. V 1975).
20. Id. at §§ 1651, 1653(c).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. V 1975).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
24. See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1975).
26. Id. at (b), (f. United States v. Independent Bulk Transp., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1319
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. W.B. Enterprises, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
see United States v. Le Beouf Bros. Towing Co., 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976). See also
Gulf Refining Co. v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 300 (E.D. Tex. 1976). In one particularly
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, The most serious failings of these acts are that they do not extend
jurisdiction over oil pollution beyond the waters of the United States
or its contiguous zone, 27 nor have they been interpreted as grants
of private causes of action for oil pollution. 28 In Burgess v. M1 V
Tamano,29 it was held that neither the Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tion Act of 1899 nor the Water Quality Improvement Act of 19703°-
the direct predecessor of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972-would support such a claim when private
parties seek to recover damages against the federal government for
allegedly negligent cleanup operations subsequent to a spill.31 And in
Parsell v. Shell Oil Co.,s2 it was specifically determined that section 13
of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act "does not create a private
interesting series of cases, the government sought first to force large operators to cease
pollution on a public nuisance theory, United States v. Ira S. Bushney & Sons, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972), then later obtained an injunction against such pollution.
United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd mrnem.,
487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7), (9) (Supp. V 1975).
United States Senators Edmund D. Muskie and William D. Hathaway of Maine
have introduced legislation designed to extend United States jurisdiction over oil pollu-
tion outward to a point 200 miles from shore. 7 ENVIR. REo'. (BNA) 1463 (1977). The
legislation is in two parts: one bill would amend § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1975); the other would
amend the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (Supp. V
1975). These bills have been under consideration by two Senate Committees: Environ-
ment and Public Works; and Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Other recent Congressional developments in the aftermath of the Argo Merchant
and its companion mishaps include the introduction of S. 182 by Sen. Edward Kennedy
of Massachusetts to amend the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. S. 182, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This bill would provide for the establishment of a traffic control
system for oil tankers (§ 3(b)(A)), as well as mandatory navigational equipment and
construction standards (§ 3(b)(B)-(F)), with existing tankers being retrofitted over a five
year period (§ 3(b)(G)). In addition, S. 182 prohibits discharges of oil "into the aquatic
and terrestrial environment," which is defined to include the navigable waters of the
United States, its adjacent shorelines, the waters of the contiguous zone, the waters
within the safety zone around a deepwater port, and the waters superadjacent to the
Continental Shelf (§§ 503-04). Hearings were held on the hill in the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation from June 9 through June 20, 1977. The
hearings were adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.
28. Some writers have suggested that private citizens should urge the courts to
derive such rights of action from the statutes. See, e.g., Comment, Oil Pollution of the
Sea, 10 HARv. INr'L L.J. 316, 349 (1969) [hereinafter Oil Pollution of the Sea].
29. 373 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Me. 1974).
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1361 (Supp. V 1975).
31. 373 F. Supp. at 844, 845. See M/V Tamano Actions, 1975 Am. Mar. Cases 2174
(D. Me. 1975). But cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
wherein the court noted that certain private rights of action are "necessary to effectuate
the purposes intended to be served by the [Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899].
32. 421 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976),
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cause of action under the laws of the United States so as to provide an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction outside of admiralty." 3
IV. THE STATE RESPONSE
The Supreme Court, in Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 34 recognized that there is room for state involvement in the crea-
tion of remedies for vessel oil pollution. Askew upheld the constitution-
ality of the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act,3 5
the forerunner of the current Florida Pollutant Spill Prevention and
Control Act [hereinafter Florida Act].36
The state response to Askew has been striking. As of July 1975, each
of the twenty-two coastal states and Puerto Rico had enacted laws
allowing some types of recovery for pollution damage.3 7 Some states,
including Florida, allow for recovery of damages for injuries to persons
or property beyond the costs recoverable for cleanup and removal of
the oil.38
Under the Florida Act persons claiming pollution injury can pursue
their remedies either through administrative proceedings9 or through
the courts.4 0 Persons opting for the administrative route would be re-
quired to file an application containing a sworn statement of damages
with the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund41 The claimants and
the person identified as responsible for the pollution by the executive
director of the fund could either negotiate a settlement or submit the
claim to arbitration.4 2 In each case, payment would be made directly
to the claimant from the fund.4 3
Persons deciding to sue the alleged polluter are the recipients of
a special advantage under the Florida Act. In such an action the
plaintiff need not "plead or prove negligence in any form or manner."' 4
33. Id. at 1280.
34. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
35. Ch. 70-244, 1970 Fla. Laws 244.
36. FLA. STAT. ch. 376 (1975).
37. DEP'T OF JUSTiCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 35. In Evans v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
97 S. Ct. 729 (1977) (mem.), appeal docketed sub nom. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
No. 76-930 (Mar. 1, 1977), Justice Rehnquist granted a stay of a permanent injunction
pending the Court's consideration of whether WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170-.190
(Supp. 1975), which attempts "to decrease the likelihood of oil spills on Puget Sound
and its shorelines," is preempted by the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1221-1227 (Supp. V 1975), 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1970).
38." DEPT OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 37.
39. FLA. STAT. § 376.12 (1975).
40. Id. § 576.205.
41. Id. § 576.12(2).
42. Id. § 376.12(2)(a), (b).
43. Id. § 376.12(2)(a), (e).
44. Id. § 376.205.
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Once the person proves the fact of the prohibited discharge, the de-
fendant can rely on only four defenses as an excuse: (1) an act of war,
(2) an act of government, (3) an act of God, and (4) an act or omission
of a third party.45
There are, however, four coastal states whose statutes relating to
oil pollution merely codify the common law remedies:' 6 Georgia,47
Alabama," Louisiana,49 and Califomia. 50 Residents of these states
seeking to bring actions against owners whose vessels have spilled oil
onto their beaches must grapple with the existing remedies available
to them in admiralty and at common law. This paper will explore their
admiralty remedies.
V. ADMIRALTY REMEDIES
A. Jurisdiction
The Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act
expanded admiralty jurisdiction to include "all cases of damage or
injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water,
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated
on land." 51 The courts are in agreement that this language allows
persons seeking damages for oil pollution to sue in admiralty.
52
In California v. S.S. Bournemouth,53 a federal district court ruled
that the Jurisdiction Act did not allow a state to sue in admiralty for
a tort where the damage occurred to the water itself and was not "done
or consummated on land .... 54 However, the court went on to hold
45. Id. §§ 376.205, .12(4)(a)-(d).
46. DEP'T OF JuSTIcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 49 n.14. Although the Dept't of
JusTicE REPORT cited Massachusetts as lacking any other than common law remedies for
private parties suffering oil pollution, the state now provides for specific private
remedies. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 91, § 59A (Supp. 1977-78), provides that any person
negligently depositing crude petroleum or any of its products into tidal water or flats
shall be liable in tort for double damages to the person whose property is harmed.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 21, § 27(14) (Supp. 1977-78), provides that persons discharging
oil into state waters shall be jointly and severally liable to the commonwealth and to
other persons for damages to real and personal property.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-517 (1971). Section 17-521.2 (Supp. 1977) establishes the
mechanism by which the state can impose civil penalties.
48. ALA. CODE tit. 8, § 320(d) (Supp. 1973). This provision, which took effect on
Jan. 19, 1974, is part of Alabama's general attempt to preserve and develop coastal areas.
ALA. CODE tit. 8, 99 312-320 (Supp. 1973).
49. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56:1446(D) (Supp. 1977).
50. CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(D) (Supp. 1977). For a recent California case inter-
preting the provisions of this section see Younger v. Superior Court, 544 P.2d 1322 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1976). See also CAL. HAm. & NAV. CODE §§ 151-152 (Supp. 1977).
51. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
52. See, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F, Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973).
53. 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
54. Id. at 925,
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that an oil spill, even if it never reaches land, is itself a maritime tort
of a nature sufficient to give rise to a maritime lien, so that an in rem
admiralty action can be maintained. 55
The admiralty claimant can bring his action in personam against
the vessel owner, in rem against the vessel, or in personam against the
owner and in rem against the vessel.5 6 If the claimant cannot obtain
jurisdiction over the owner or the vessel, he can bring an in personam
action with a prayer for attachment. This last procedure enables the
claimant to attach any of the defendant's property in the hands of
third party obligors or garnishees which is within the court's jurisdic-
tion.5T Once jurisdiction of some sort has been obtained, the admiralty
claimant faces two problems: successfully asserting a theory of re-
covery and preventing or circumventing the owner's attempt to limit
his liability.
B. Theories of Recovery
(1) Common Law.-Pollution caused by an oil spill into United
States waters is a maritime tort.5s In constructing the law of such torts,
admiralty courts have drawn on the general maritime law of the
United States and common law tort principles, which provide three
theories for recovery in oil pollution cases: trespass, nuisance, and
negligence.59
a. Trespass
In Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp.,60 plaintiffs brought an
action in trespass, nuisance, and negligence against the master and
owners of the S.S. Inverpool, a small tanker which had run aground
on the revetment wall past Salter's Buoy off the coast of England in
heavy weather in December, 1950. In order to preserve both the vessel
and its crew, the master jettisoned approximately 400 tons of his fuel
oil cargo which eventually washed up onto plaintiffs' foreshore.6 1 The
trial judge held that the plaintiffs had causes of action in trespass and
nuisance;62 however, they had to prove that the defendants had been
negligent.6 3 This ruling was eventually upheld by the House of Lords,
but Lord Tucker took the occasion to observe that in his opinion
there was not a good cause of action in trespass, "as the discharge of
55. Id. at 928-29.
56. Admiralty Remedies, supra note 10, at 128-29.
57. Id. at 129-30.
58. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. at 249.
59. Oil Pollution of the Sea, supra note 28, at 347-48.
60. [1956] A.C. 218 (1955).
61. Id. at 218, 220.
62. Id. at 225.
63. Id. at 232.
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the oil was not done directly on to the foreshore but outside in the
estuary.' ' s4
Although no American cases have addressed the issue of recovery
for oil pollution on a trespass theory, recent commentators agree that
the intent to intrude on the plaintiff's land is difficult to demonstrate. "
Given this fact, potential plaintiffs would be well advised to focus
their claims for relief on theories of nuisance and negligence.
b. Nuisance
Plaintiffs seeking to recover damages for an oil spill under a
nuisance theory face three burdens: they must show that they have
suffered "special" damage, they must demonstrate that the spill is
properly termed a "nuisance," and they must prove that the spill
resulted either from defendant's negligence or intentional actions.
When a nuisance affects the public at large, as it would in the case
of a significant oil spill, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his damage
is different from that suffered by the public.66 This burden has been
met in several cases.
In Burgess v. M1 V Tamano, 7 plaintiffs were commercial fishermen,
commercial clam diggers, and owners of motels, campgrounds, and
other business establishments. All had suffered from oil damage after
the tanker M/V Tamano struck a ledge and spilled 100,000 gallons of
Bunker C oil into Hussey Sound, Maine, on July 22, 1972.68 The
court reasoned that the fishermen and claim diggers had no individual
property rights with respect to the waters and marine life harmed by
the spill and that they could therefore recover only if they could
successfully maintain private damage actions for the invasion of a
public right.69 For such a showing, these plaintiffs were required to
demonstrate damage different in kind rather than degree from that
suffered by the general public.7 0 The court concluded that the plaintiffs
could make such a showing based on their status as persons whose very
livelihood was drawn from the affected waters.7 1
The court further noted that the businessmen who did not own
beachfront lots "complain only of loss of customers indirectly resulting
from alleged pollution of the coastal waters and beaches in, which
64. Id. at 244.
65. Post, A Solution to the Problem of Private Compensation in Oil Discharge
Situations, 28 U. MIAmI L. REV. 524, 527 (1974); Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans,
37 FoRD. L. REv. 155, 170-71 (1968).
66. Post, supra note 65, at 530-51.
67. 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1975).
68. Id. at 248-49.
69. Id. at 250.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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they do not have a property interest," and dismissed their claims.7 2 It
retained jurisdiction over the claims of those businessmen who were
beachfront property owners and whose property was physically injured
by the spill.73
The Burgess court did not clarify whether it would be willing to
award damages to private parties who own beachfront property but
do not use it for commercial purposes. However, in In re Petition of
New Jersey Barging Corp.,4 a court awarded damages to 155 beach-
front owners, some of whom were not using their property for com-
mercial purposes,7 5 "for such annoyance, inconvenience and discom-
fort suffered by particular claimants [after almost 2,000 barrels of
tanker oil had been spilled into New Haven Harbor 7 ] to the extent
of and in an amount commensurate with the annoyance and discom-
fort proven. ''7 7 In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in Oppen v. Aetna In-
surance Co.,78 has ruled that physical damage to plaintiffs' pleasure
boats, caused by the Santa Barbara oil platform blowout, probably
constituted a sufficiently different injury to support a recovery for
private nuisance.79 Damages were recoverable, however, under a negli-
gence theory.
At least one court has held that an oil spill cannot be classified a
"nuisance" because it is not an event of a continuing nature. In Mary-
land v. Amareda Hess Corp.,80 State of Maryland sued for the cost
of abating the "nuisance" resulting from the rupture of an oil transfer
line connecting the S.S. Kadmos and a shore terminal owned by
Amerada Hess. In denying the state's claim, the court ruled that
nuisance could not be found to exist absent "an ongoing phenomenon
consisting of some recurring act or acts and/or a continuous condi-
tion,"81 and held that "a single occurrence oil spill does not now and
has never in the absence of legislation amounted to a common law
nuisance. ... 2
In granting the right to a nuisance-based recovery for oil spill
damage, the Burgess, New Jersey Barging, and Oppen courts did not
specifically address the question of whether the spill had to be a con-
72. Id. at 251.
73. Id.
74. 144 F. Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), comm'r's report adopted, 168 F. Supp. 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
75. 168 F. Supp. at 938.
76. 144 F. Supp. at 340.
77. 168 F. Supp. at 937.
78. 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
79. Id. at 260.
80. 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
81. Id. at 1068 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 1069.
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tinuing problem. One writer has suggested that the New Jersey Barging
decision can be based on the principle that where the harm is "in-
stantaneous and substantial," a nuisance action can be maintained
irrespective of the nuisance's duration. s3 Potential plaintiffs in oil spill
actions should note that several courts have been willing to ignore
the "continuing phenomenon" in granting nuisance-based relief.
Finally, the general rule is that a claimant must show either
negligence or intentional conduct on the part of the defendant in
order to recover under a nuisance theory.8 ' This fact has apparently
presented little problem in three American oil spill cases where
nuisance recovery has been granted or allowed. In Petition of New
Jersey Barging Corp., 5 the court merely recited the facts and concluded
that the negligence of a tanker crew member was clear. The question
of negligence on the part of the defendants was never broached in
Burgess v. MIVTamano, 6 perhaps because the rulings were made on
motions to dismiss. However, the court did refer to defendant's
"tortious" interference with the livelihood of the clam diggers and
fishermen.17 And in Oppen v. Aetna Insurance Co., the only reference
to negligence was made in the same sentence which left the way open
for nuisance recovery: "[t]he plaintiffs' physical damages are recover-
able in negligence and probably also constitute such special injury as
to present them with a cause of action for these damages in nuisance."88
c. Negligence
Under common law negligence principles, a plaintiff can recover
damages from oil pollution if he can establish that the defendant owed
him a duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct in dealing
with the oil, that the defendant failed to conform to that standard,
and that defendant's failure was the proximate cause of plaintiff's own
damage 9
One writer has commented that:
As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible to prove negligence
on the part of the owners of the tanker. The problem of proving
faulty construction of a tanker built, perhaps, in Japan, Germany,
Norway or Greece, or faulty seamanship by a vessel flying the
Liberian or Panamanian flag and carrying a multi-national crew,
83. Post, supra note 65, at 529-30.
84. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 87, at 575 (4th ed. 1971).
85. 144 F. Supp. at 341.
86. 370 F. Supp. at 249.
87. Id. at 250.
88. 485 F.2d at 260.
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 84, § 30, at 143.
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is beyond the ability of a property owner whose shoreline is ruined
by oil spillage.90
This observation notwithstanding, four of the six courts which have
explicitly addressed the negligence issue in the oil spill context have
found the vessel owners and operators guilty of negligent conduct,'
In Petition of New Jersey Barging Corp.,92 the tanker Perth Amboy
No. 1 was loading a cargo of fuel oil in New Haven Harbor during
the late evening and early morning of September 26 and 27, 1954.
The owner's employee, who had the duty of advising the pump house
once the tanker was full, went to sleep while the loading was in
progress. Approximately 2000 barrels of oil overflowed into the
harbor.93 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York concluded that "[o]n the evidence in this case there can
be no question as to the negligence of the tankerman [the employee],
and that the immediate result was the oil spill."94 The Perth Amboy
was held liable in rem, although the court allowed the owner's petition
for limitation of liability.95
The House of Lords, in Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. The
Miller Steamship Co.,96 found the vessel owner and its operators
negligent on the following facts. In the early hours of October 30,
1951, the tanker Wagon Mound had been taking in bunkering oil
while moored at a wharf in Morts Bay, Sydney Harbor, Australia. The
court found that by reason of the carelessness of the Wagon Mound
engineers, a large quantity of this oil overflowed into the bay and
eventually spread under the claimant's wharf.9 7 The proceedings in
this case and Overseas Tankship, Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering
Co.,"8 a predecessor, were devoted largely to the question whether the
vessel owners could be held liable for a fire which resulted from molten
lead falling on inflammable material and igniting the oil under the
claimant's dock-but the threshold issue of negligence for the spill
itself was never in question.
Both New Jersey Barging and Miller Steamship involved situations
where negligence was rather easily proved: in both cases the offending
90. Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359, 366 (1970).
91. See also Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1974), where
the court held the defendant operator of an oil drilling platform had stipulated to
his own negligent conduct.
92. 144 F. Supp. 340.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 341.
95. Id. at 341-42.
96. [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (P.C. 1966) (commonly referred to as Wagon Mound II).
97. Id. at 502.
1977]
372 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.5:361
vessel was moored at a dock receiving oil as cargo. Two more recent
cases, however, involved less obvious fact situations, and the courts
nonetheless ruled that the vessel owners had been negligent.
In the Ocean Eagle,99 the tanker had broken in half near its No. 6
cargo tank at the entrance to San Juan harbor, spilling oil into the
surrounding waters. In the proceeding brought by the owners to limit
their liability, the United States District Court of Puerto Rico con-
ducted an exhaustive analysis of the facts and denied "exoneration or
limitation of liability"'100 on the twin grounds of unseaworthiness and
negligence.' 0 ' The court found that the Ocean Eagle had been 650
tons overloaded when she sailed into the harbor and that the master
and the chief mate each intended to overload the vessel. They "did so
blindly, without the aid of a loading manual, at the direction of the
owners ....,102 In addition, the court found that the vessel had a history
"not unknown to the owners"103 of traveling in an overloaded condition
and that the nature of the load's distribution was such that it "would
have tended to sag the vessel in the way of the No. 6 cargo tanks .... -104
The court found further that a November 1966 American Bureau
of Shipping (A.B.S.) survey of the Ocean Eagle had revealed "pipe
damage on deck and 'fractures in underdeck longitudinal frames and
girders in [three] cargo tanks,' . . . and 600 leaking rivets in the same
tanks. ' '10 5 The A.B.S. report of the survey stated that "the repairs ...
commenced . . .and had been completed," but nothing verified that
every recommended repair had been made.09 The estimated stress on
the Ocean Eagle, its history of repairs and wastage, the absence of the
loading manual (essential to guide the master in eliminating stress),
and the sixteen- to twenty-foot waves at the time of the incident
"support the [court's] conclusion that the vessel was overstressed to
the breaking point and that all that was lacking was the unfortunate
combination of events of rough seas and inexperienced navigation to
send her to the bottom.' ' 0 7
The court ruled that the owners had breached their "non-delegable
duty ... to furnish the Master with means by which he could deter-
98. [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (commonly referred to as Wagon Mound I).
99. [1974] Am. Mar. Cases 1629 (D.P.R.).
100. Id. at 1659.
101. Id. at 1655, 1659.
102. Id. at 1645.
103. Id. at 1645, 1647.
104. Id. at 1650.
105. Id. at 1648.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1653.
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mine loading stress and arrangement of cargo."''10 It termed the over-
loading and improper loading willful negligence and found that the
abandonment of the vessel with no attempt to stop the flow of oil
or to clean it up constituted willful and wanton negligence chargeable
to the owners. 10 9 The claimants were entitled to recover from the
negligent owners "the natural and probable losses resulting from the
breaking of the ship." 10 The decision is significant because the vessel
owners were held liable to private individuals.
The court in California v. S.S. Bournemouth"" applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold the vessel owners negligent. In
that case, the S.S. Bournemouth docked at Long Beach Harbor shortly
after midnight on October 3, 1969. At about ten o'clock the next
morning, a spill was located approximately 700 feet from the vessel.
The California Department of Fish and Game subsequently had the
vessel seized and attempted to recover its cleanup costs in an in rem
action 112
In order to recover, the state had to convince the court that the
Bournemouth was the actual source of the pollution and that the
spill had been negligently or intentionally caused."is With regard to
the source of the pollution, the court found three factors persuasive:
(1) the spill was located directly downwind from the vessel, (2) the
Bournemouth was the only vessel operating in the vicinity of the spill
for approximately fifteen hours prior to its discovery, and (3) three
separate comparative analyses established to a "scientific probability"
that the oil on the water and the oil from the Bournemouth came from
the same source."'4
The state had no direct evidence that the oil spill was caused by
the negligent or intentional acts of omissions of the crew. Therefore,
it relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., an event can be
attributed to the negligence of the defendant when it is one that
does not occur in the absence of negligent conduct, when it is caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant, and when it is not due to any voluntary action or contribu-
tion by the plaintiff." 5
The court concluded that each element of the doctrine had been
108. Id. at 1654.
109. Id. at 1658-59.
110. Id. at 1659.
111. 318 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1970); 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The
facts recited are taken from both opinions.
112. 307 F. Supp. at 923-24.
113. 318 F. Supp. at 840.
114. Id. at 841.
115. W. PROSSER, supra note 84, § 39, at 214; 3 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 210, 216 n.33 (1971).
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satisfied: the spill could only occur in a limited number of ways and
could not have occurred absent negligence; 116 the ship was under the
exclusive control of the defendant; and no state action contributed to
the spill. The court found the vessel owners negligent and entered a
judgment against them for the cleanup costs incurred by the state.117
Bournemouth is important because it establishes precedent for reliance
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Furthermore, since the state chose
not to invoke a relevant statute as a basis for its action, the case may
be applicable to an admiralty action by a private party.
Two older cases in which vessel owners were not liable for negli-
gence can be profitably compared with the Ocean Eagle and Bourne-
mouth. In Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp.,"8 the Second Cir-
cuit ruled that the plaintiff had failed to show negligence because it
had not adequately demonstrated that the two barges involved were
the sources of the spill." The advanced state of chemical analysis
evidenced in Bournemouth, however, indicates that the identification
problem may no longer pose an insurmountable problem.
The other vessel oil pollution case in which liability for negligence
was not found, Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp.,"0 can be
reconciled with the Ocean Eagle. In Ocean Eagle, the United States
District Court of Puerto Rico held the owners liable on the dual
theory that their negligence had led to an unseaworthy vessel, and that
their employees had wantonly failed to curtail the flow of oil. In Esso
Petroleum, the House of Lords concluded that the only issue raised
by the plaintiff's pleadings was whether the master of the Inverpool
had behaved negligently in entering the estuary channel in heavy
weather, knowing that he was suffering from a steering defect.' 12 It
concluded that the master's behavior was not negligent-but observed
in dicta that the issue of unseaworthiness had not been raised.' 22
This survey of court response to the common law theories of tres-
pass, nuisance, and negligence as means of recovering damages for
vessel oil pollution suggests the following conclusions:
(1) Trespass actions are not favored.
(2) A plaintiff who can convince the court that his injury is different
in kind from that of the public will generally be allowed to
make his argument for damages on a nuisance theory.
116. 318 F. Supp. at 841.
117. Id. at 842.
118. 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y.), rer/d, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953).
119. 208 F.2d at 175.
120. [1956] A.C. 218 (1955).
121. Id. at 220, 235-37.
122. Id. at 237, 243.
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(3) Despite the fact that negligence actions present problems 'of
proof, negligence can often be shown.
(4) In the absence of any evidence of negligence, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur can be employed.
(2) Admiralty.-Admiralty law offers at least two unique theories
aside from the traditional theories of common law recovery for oil
pollution: the doctrine of unseaworthiness and the Pennsylvania Rule.
Under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, the vessel owner traditionally
has been held strictly liable for damages occurring as a result of some
defect in either the vessel or its equipment to those in privity of con-
tract with him and to those performing the historical functions of
seamen. 123 Two United States district courts have addressed whether
this doctrine should be expanded to make vessel owners liable to
persons harmed by oil spills resulting from some unseaworthy condi-
tion and have reached opposite results.
In Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 24 the federal district court
emphasized the differences between the nature of the hazards meant
to be protected by the doctrine and those involved in oil spills. It
concluded that it "ha[d] no intention of extending the coverage of the
doctrine of seaworthiness so as to encompass a situation where, as in
the case at bar, an oil spill is alleged to have occurred in the waters
of a state due to the actions of a vessel.' 125
However, in Ocean Eagle, the Puerto Rico District Court held
that the vessel owners had a nondelegable duty "to exercise due
diligence to furnish a seaworthy ship' ' 2 6 and that a breach of that
duty resulting in oil pollution damage gave rise to a cause of action
for damages by private parties. 2 7 The importance of this holding lies
in the fact that an owner held liable under the doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness would not be able successfully to petition to limit his liability in
the aftermath of an oil spill. 128
In the Ocean Eagle, the court was forced to conduct an exhaustive
review of the facts before it concluded that the owners had breached
their duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. One writer has suggested an
alternative method for establishing that such a breach has occurred. 29
Under his theory the court would be requested to extend the Kernan
123. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
124. 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
125. Id. at 1071.
126. [1974] Am. Mar. Cases at 1655 (D.P.R.).
127. id. at 1654, 1659.
128. Sweeney, supra note 65, at 169.
129. Id. at 185-86.
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doctrine to oil spill cases.'30 Once the government had instituted pro-
ceedings against the owner for violation of a regulatory statute, the
vessel would, under Kernan, be deemed unseaworthy and the claimant
could then use this fact in an action for damages from a spill emanating
from that vessel.' 3 ' The difficulty with this reasoning is that Kernan
was a personal injury action and its holding was firmly rooted in an
analysis of the history of the Federal Employee's Liability Act.
13 2
Thus, the policy reasons mitigating in favor of recovery in 'Kernan
would not appear to control in an action for oil spill damage.
The same writer who advocates the novel application of the Kernan
doctrine has suggested that the "Pennsylvania Rule" be invoked to
hold a vessel liable for oil pollution damage. 33 Under the Pennsyl-
vania Rule, a vessel involved in a collision and found in violation of
a statute or regulation governing its conduct must demonstrate not
only that the violation did not contribute to the collision but that
it could not have contributed to it.13' The argument is made that this
rule "suggests a holding that evidence of a criminal violation [of an
oil pollution statute or regulation] creates a presumption of fault
thereby shifting to the shipowners the burden of proving that the
violation could not have contributed to the damage."'1 s5 No court
has yet adopted this theory of liability for oil pollution.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY
Even if the plaintiff convinces a court that he should recover
damages in an oil spill action, he faces the prospect of a severely
130. Id. This doctrine springs from the holding in Kernan v. American Dredging
Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958). In Kernan, a seaman was killed as a result of an explosion
and fire traceable to the violation of a Coast Guard regulation. The Court reasoned
that where a statute or regulation had been violated, the owner of the vessel should
be held strictly liable for ensuing damages "without regard to whether the injury
flowing from the violation was the injury the statute sought to guard against." Id.
at 438. Thus, applying the Kernan doctrine to oil spill cases, once the government
has. initiated proceedings against the polluting vessel's owner for violating any regula-
tion, whether or not related to pollution prevention, the person claiming damages
might rely upon the government's action to establish strict liability for the spill.
131. Id.
132. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
133. Sweeney, supra note 65, at 185-86.
134. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873). In this case, the owners of
two vessels which had collided in dense fog were held equally liable for damages. It
was observed, however, in dicta that "when . . . a ship at the time of a collision is in
actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions. ... the burden rests
upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the
causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been." Id. at 136.
135. Sweeney, supra note 65, at 186.
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limited recovery fund. The Federal Limitation of Liability Act'38
allows the owner of a vessel to petition to limit his liability for
damages to the value of the vessel and her freight following a spill not
within his "privity or knowledge.'' 137 In four petitions to limit liability
which have been reported in United States courts since 1956, each
court has relied heavily on its perception of the equities of the situa-
tion, and the decisions are evenly split.
In Petition of New Jersey Barging Corp.,1 38 the federal district
court at the outset found that the spill had resulted from the negligence
of an employee, but it went on to note that the employee "was a
certified tankerman and there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that
he was not completely qualified and competent as such prior to the
night of the oil spill."' 19 The court then examined the petitioner's
actions subsequent to the spill and found that its agent had acted
reasonably in attempting to carry out cleanup operations. The court
concluded that while the negligence of the employee precluded the
petitioner from exoneration, the petitioner's positive efforts subsequent
to the spill supported its claim for limitation' 0
The other successful petition was granted -in Complaint of
Harbor Towing Corp.'41 In Harbor Towing, the barge Shamrock was
being loaded with 7,000 barrels of heavy fuel oil by Humble Oil
Company in Baltimore Harbor. The federal district court found
that "either through the negligence of Harbor Towing [the owner]
and/or Humble Oil, 68,000 gallons of oil were discharged into the
harbor. ' ' 142 Resulting claims in excess of $1,000,000 were filed, and
Harbor Towing sought to limit its liability to the value of the barge
and its freight.
The court relied on the "privity or knowledge" language of the
Limitation of Liability Act in reaching its decision. Pointing out
that the Act expressly allowed limitation when the owner lacked
such knowledge, and finding that "[i]n the present case, the owner
was apparently unaware of the condition causing the loss," the court
ruled that the petition to limit liability should be allowed.'4 3
Courts have denied the petition to limit liability in the two cases
involving oil spills by vessels in transit. In the first case, the charterer
136. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1970).
137. Id. § 183(a).
138. 144 F. Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), comm'r's report adopted, 168 F. Supp. 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
139. 144 F. Supp. at 341.
140. Id. at 341-42.
141. 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971).
142. Id. at 1152.
143. Id. at 1154.
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of the SIT Torrey Canyon petitioned for limitation after the tanker
ran aground on March 18, 1967, sixteen miles off the coast of England
and spilled 15,000,000 gallons of oil, contaminating from 75 to 175
miles of beach and triggering a cleanup operation costing over
$ 16,000,000."4 In ruling on the petition, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit first observed that the Limitation Act restricts
the ability to limit liability to owners and bareboat charterers. Next it
noted that Union Oil Company, the charterer in this case, was operat-
ing under a time charter,'4 5 and that it was not being proceeded against
as an owner but rather as an entity which had been involved in the
manufacture and design of the vessel. Based on these facts, the court
held that Union would not be allowed to limit.
14
The Second Circuit's decision has been strongly criticized on the
ground that it ignored the reality of Union's relationship to the Torrey
Canyon:
The vessel was placed in service as an integral part of Union's
tanker fleet, with her stack and bow painted with Union's insignia,
and flying Union's house flag. . . Union Oil was responsible for
all, costs of procuring, enlarging, and operating the Torrey
Canyon ....
Union expressly reserved the right to demand the discharge of
the master or officers if "dissatisfied" with their conduct ...
Although title to the ship was retained by Barracuda Tanker
Corporation, the status of Union Oil, when viewed substantively and
not solely as a matter of form, is that of a de facto owner or demise
charterer, a beneficial owner, or a charterer deemed to be an owner
within 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1964). 1 47
But even if the true nature of the relationship between Union
and the Torrey Canyon was not lost on the Second Circuit, its decision
144. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd in part,
409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969). Although the actual cleanup costs for the oil spill
exceeded $16,000,000, the claims were ultimately settled for $7,200,000. Note, Liability
for Oil Pollution Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL
L. REv. 973, 982 (1970). See Admiralty Remedies, supra note 10.
145. A time charter differs materially from a bareboat charter. Under a time charter,
the owner is responsible for manning and operating the vessel. Under a bareboat charter,
the charterer is vested with responsibility and control over the vessel for the duration
of the voyage. GiMORE & BLAcK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 229-30, 239-40 (2d ed. 1975).
146. 409 F.2d at 1015. The trial court allowed Barracuda Tanker Corp., the tanker
owner, to limit its liability. That ruling was not appealed.
147. Admiralty Remedies, supra note 10, at 139-40 n.151.
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can be explained by its acknowledged desire to restrict the scope of
the Limitation of Liability Act.' "4
Such an attitude is also reflected in the most recent oil spill limita-
tion decision, Ocean Eagle.149 Faced with a spill totalling 3,500,000
gallons and cleanup claims amounting to $700,000, the federal district
court painstakingly reconstructed the history of the vessel and con-
cluded that her owners had been negligent, that such negligence had
resulted in an unseaworthy vessel, and that the owners were therefore
unable to limit their liability.150 In marked contrast to the situation in
New Jersey Barging, the vessel owner's agents in Ocean Eagle had made
no effort to mitigate the oil damage once the spill had occurred-
behavior which the court deemed to be willfully and wantonly negli-
gent.' 51 One express ground for its denial of limitation was "public
policy and equitable consideration.'1 52
Since the outcome appears to hinge on the particular actions of
the owner and his agents in each case, plaintiffs in an oil spill action
should explore methods for combatting limitation petitions. The most
direct approach would be to convince the court, as was done in Ocean
Eagle, that the spill resulted from an unseaworthy vessel. Faced with
such a ruling "the owner would be unable to meet his statutory
burden of proving that [the] unseaworthy condition occurred without
his privity or knowledge."153
Should it be impossible to establish unseaworthiness, the plaintiff
might consider initiating a direct action against the insurer of the
vessel. Residents of Louisiana, for example, could employ their direct
action statute in an effort to reach a larger fund than would normally
be available to them after an owner had successfully petitioned for
limitation. 5 4
The application of the Louisiana statute to marine insurance
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cush-
ing."5 Under the procedure approved in that case, direct actions against
148. See 409 F.2d at 1015.
149. [1974] Am. Mar. Cases 1629 (D.P.R.).
150. [1974] Am. Mar. Cases at 1655, 1659.
151. Id. at 1658-59.
152. Id. at 1657.
153. Sweeney, supra note 65, at 169.
154. LA. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 655 (West Supp. 1977). For a suggestion that a
direct right of action against a marine insurer might be available in Florida as well,
see Note, The Applicability of Florida Direct Action in the Law of Admiralty, 1 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 335 (1972).
155. 347 U.S. 409 (1954). More recent cases which involve the Louisiana direct action
statute are Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
La. 1970).
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the insurer must be delayed until after the conclusion of limitation
proceedings. At that time claimants could file suit for the balance of
the insurance proceeds remaining after the owner had been reimbursed
by the insurer for the amount he paid into the limitation fund.
1 56
This procedure would be particularly appealing where because of
damage to or destruction of the vessel, the limitation fund was minimal.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has been written from the perspective of a private
beach owner seeking admiralty remedies for damages caused by an
oil spill. A review of the relevant cases leads to the following con-
clusions:
(1) Modern identification techniques, coupled with the availability
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, increase the probability that
a private party could succeed in establishing liability on the
part of the offending vessel and her owners.
(2) The prospects for avoiding limitation of liability problems are
uncertain. Unless the claimant can rely upon a statutory right
of direct action against the insurer of the vessel, he may be
frustrated in his recovery.
In sum, the current state of admiralty law should spur concerned
beachowners in Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and California to en-
deavor to persuade their legislators to enact protective legislation
similar to that now in force in Florida.
156. 347 Us. at 425, 427, (Clark, J., concurring).
